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O33This paper discusses the implications of autonomous-connected-electric-shared vehicles (ACES) for public ﬁnance,
which have so far been widely ignored in the literature. In OECD countries, 5–12% of federal and up to 30% of
local tax revenues are currently collected from fuel and vehicle taxation. The diffusion of ACESwill signiﬁcantly reduce
these important sources of government revenues and affect transport-related government expenditures, unless addi-
tional policies are introduced to align the new technological context with the tax revenue requirements. We argue
that the realization of socioeconomic beneﬁts of ACES depends on the implementation of tailored public ﬁnance pol-
icies, which can take advantage of the increase in data availability from the further digitalization of transportation sys-
tems. In particular, the introduction of road tolls in line with ‘user pays’ and ‘polluter pays’ principleswill becomemore
feasible for policy. Moreover, innovation in taxation schemes toﬁt the changing technological circumstancesmay alter
the relative importance of levels of governance in transport policy making, likely shifting power towards local, in par-
ticular urban, governmental levels. We ﬁnally argue that, given the risk of path-dependencies and lock-in to sub-
optimal public ﬁnance regimes if policies are implemented late, further research and near-term policy actions taken
during the diffusion process of ACES are required.Keywords:
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This paper discusses the case of autonomous connected electric vehicles
(ACES), which are the result of four major ongoing techno-economic devel-
opments in transportation: automation (automated vehicles: AVs), connectiv-
ity and digitalization (connected vehicles or CVs), electriﬁcation (electric
vehicles: EVs), and shared ownership (shared vehicles: SVs). These technolo-
gies separately, but especially in their combination are expected to lead to
major disruptions in the transport market, which has been in a fairly stable
technological regime over the past decades (Pinkse et al., 2014; Dijk et al.,
2016). Although the pace and shape of the disruptive changes induced bynected, electric shared vehicles (ACES) and publicﬁnance: An ex..., Trans-
/j.trip.2019.100038
2 OECD Tax database; http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-database.htm#VATTables,
Table 4.A, 4.6 and Table 4.A4.7.
3 In the US, States levy taxes on fuel in different ways. For example, some states impose per-
gallon excise taxes at the pump, others levy taxes applying to the purchase of gasoline. The av-
erage rates vary widely between states (API, 2019). Most states (except for Florida, Maryland
andNewHampshire) do not adjust their gasoline tax based on inﬂation,whichmeans that over
time, inﬂation reduces the purchasing power of the tax rate. In all states, transportation tax rev-
enues need to be supplemented with income and sales tax to pay for transportation infrastruc-
ture (The Tax Foundation, 2018).
4 There are, however, some cases of partial earmarking of fuel tax revenues. This has been
necessary in some countries, for instance as a justiﬁcation for signiﬁcant increases in fuel taxes,
or as an easily recognisable instrument for stable ﬁnancing of chronic-deﬁcit public services
like urban public transport.
M.W. Adler et al. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxxACES cannot be predicted accurately at this point in time, there seems to be
a consensus in the relevant literature that after 2040 most vehicle sales will
be electric and capable of autonomous driving, with connectivity being an
essential prerequisite for autonomous driving and potential force for shared
ownership (Leech et al., 2015; Kaas et al., 2016; Ranft et al., 2016).
In this paper, we focus on the public ﬁnance implications of ACES. The
relationship between ACES and public ﬁnance is recommended as a subject
for further study by the European Commission Joint Research Center
(Alonso Raposo et al., 2018, p.151). The topic is brieﬂy discussed in a hand-
ful of policy papers (Clark et al., 2017; Peterson and Lewis, 2017; Mares
et al., 2018) as well as newspaper articles (e.g. Fung, 2016), but to our
knowledge has not received attention in academia. The topic is timely
and important, as the technological developments enabling the introduc-
tion of ACES progress quickly albeit incrementally, and policy makers
need to be prepared for the potential challenges resulting from the impacts
of ACES on public ﬁnance. This is particularly true due to the path depen-
dencies and potential lock-in effects in suboptimal ﬁscal regimes which
have many precedents in the transport sector.
This article connects the topics of ACES and public ﬁnances by combin-
ing interdisciplinary research from public ﬁnance, transport economics,
urban economics, innovation and technology, energy as well as environ-
mental economics. The paper outlines the relevant aspects of public ﬁ-
nances of vehicles for a set of countries. We then proceed to summarize
the forecasted technological and mobility ramiﬁcations of ACES that are
important to public revenues and expenditures. This allows us to hypothe-
size crucial elements in the upcoming of ACES for publicﬁnances, as well as
make some overarching policy recommendations and propose avenues for
further research.
Currently, fuel and vehicle taxation generate approximately 5–12% of
federal and up to 30% of local tax revenue in OECD countries (Eurostat,
2018; OECD tax database). On the expenditure side, about 1–3%of national
and up to 50%of regional budgets are assigned to land-based transport. The
pending introduction of ACES is expected to have signiﬁcant impacts,
among others, on fuel consumption, travel demand, car ownership struc-
ture, public transport, infrastructure requirements, and the wider economy,
and as a consequence also on ﬁscal revenues and expenditures. With an in-
creasing electriﬁcation of the car ﬂeet, revenues from fuel taxes will fall
substantially (and tax rates on electricity are only a fraction of the former).
If car- and ride-sharing are adopted widely, revenues from vehicle registra-
tion and circulation taxes may decline. Required investments in infrastruc-
ture (e.g. telecommunication and energy) and public transport may
increase at least in the short and medium run but are likely to decrease in
the long run. The impacts of ACES on the wider economy are expected to
be positive, but the size of the impact and its ﬁscal ramiﬁcations are highly
uncertain. According to Karpilow and Winston (2016), if vehicle automa-
tion reduces congestion the US could gain from an increase in employment,
an increase inwages and an increase inGDPgrowth by 1.8%with respect to
2010 GDP levels. For the EU, Ranft et al. (2016) ﬁnd that when taking into
account broader cost savings and productivity effects from vehicle automa-
tion as well as potential supportive policies, a GDP increase of up to 7%
with respect to 2016 levels mightmaterialize.We argue that tailored public
ﬁnance policies are essential to ensure that the beneﬁts of ACES outweigh
the corresponding costs and thereby help decrease uncertainty in this tran-
sition. If the transition towards ACES is not managedwell at the policy level
using an anticipatory approach, a loss of revenue from vehicle taxation and
an increase in negative external costs can impact public ﬁnance and social
welfare adversely. More speciﬁcally, we argue that the increased demand
for mobility due to the availability of affordable and convenient ACES
and the expected obsolescence of the currently common steering instru-
ments in transport (fuel tax, parking charges) renders the introduction of
targeted taxes in line with ‘user pays’ and ‘polluter pays’ principles neces-
sary and feasible. We anticipate a shift in the importance of levels of gover-
nance: with targeted taxation schemes and declining federal tax revenues
from fuel, registration and circulation taxes, local (in particular, urban)
levels of governance are likely to gain a higher relevance in transport policy
making. Moreover, we emphasize that path dependencies may lead to2suboptimal taxation systems that are hard to re-adjust in the future, mainly
due to a lack of public acceptance.
While the focus of this article lies on ACES employed for passenger
transport with a capacity that can range from one-person-vehicles to vehi-
cles that hold about a dozen persons (minibuses), many arguments can
also be transferred to the freight sector and high-capacity passenger trans-
port vehicles (such as trains, buses, and trams). Moreover, our main argu-
ments also hold for vehicles that rely on other zero-emission technologies,
powered for instance by hydrogen.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of
current transport-related tax revenues and expenditures. Section 3 ﬁrst
gives an outlook on ACES, and proceeds with discussing likely ﬁscal effects
of ACES, and the effect of ACES on transport-related externalities. Section 4
discusses our main hypotheses regarding public ﬁnance with respect to
ACES and provides recommendations for future research. Finally,
Section 5 concludes and makes concrete policy recommendations.
2. Status-quo: Vehicle-related tax revenues and expenditures
This section discusses the status-quo of transport-related taxes and ex-
penditures of selected OECD countries. The aim is to give an overview of
vehicle-related public ﬁnance for the EU and the US citing ofﬁcial tax rev-
enue and expenditure statistics, in order to provide a frame for the discus-
sion of the potential ﬁscal implications of ACES. Despite efforts to make
ﬁscal accounts related to vehicles comparable between countries, there is
only limited, up-to-date data available (Nash, 2003; Gomez and Vassallo,
2013; Link and Kunert, 2017).
2.1. Revenues from vehicle-related taxes, fees and charges
We can observe substantial differences with respect to vehicle taxation
across countries; in terms of available tax instruments, their design and
intended goals, and the level of governance at which speciﬁc tax revenues
are collected. There are however some similarities across countries, espe-
cially with regards to the following three tax categories, which make up a
large share of vehicle-related tax revenues in most countries, and that are
usually levied at the federal level:
Gasoline taxes, including value-added-tax (VAT) and sales tax: Gaso-
line taxes exist in all OECD countries with the exception of Mexico, which
only imposes a VAT.2 In the United States, all states levy an additional
sales tax on gasoline purchases (Pomerleau, 2015; API, 2019). Often tax
rates applied to gas and diesel differ: in the EU, there is a tendency to
base fuel taxation on the energy content of the fuel source and the contribu-
tion to CO2 pollution, whereas in the US,3 fuel taxes are intended to inter-
nalize road deterioration, and are hence referred to as “road use” taxes.
Revenues from gasoline taxes are earmarked in some but not all European
countries (European Commission, 2002) for transport purposes.4
The registration taxes are usually a one-off tax that must be paid when a
car, motorcycle or light goods vehicle is registered for the ﬁrst time in a spe-
ciﬁc country. In some countries it also has to be levied on purchases of used
cars. Usually the registration fee varies between car types and depends for in-
stance on the purchase price, CO2 emissions/fuel efﬁciency, cylinder capac-
ity, engine power, vehicle type, weight, fuel, trafﬁc safety (e.g., Denmark),
seats (e.g., Italy), vehicle length (e.g., Malta), and vehicle age. In some
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2017). In most countries, the registration tax is levied at the level of the na-
tional government, however, there are exceptions, such as France, Belgium,
or the US. In the latter, they may even be city- or county-speciﬁc. In general,
a value added tax (VAT) or sales tax is levied on top of the purchase price.
The circulation (or vehicle ownership) tax is levied on cars registered
for usage. It exists in most OECD countries; exceptions within the EU are
Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, which do not levy any circulation tax. Its size
and computation vary widely across countries. It often depends on factors
such as engine power, cylinder capacity, CO2 emissions, fuel consumption,
weight, or vehicle age. Similar to the registration tax, it is usually levied by
the federal state, but in some countries, it is levied at lower governmental
levels. For instance, in Belgium and Russia, it is in the responsibility of
the regions. In several countries (e.g. the Netherlands), EVs are exempt
from annual circulation taxes (ACEA, 2017).
Other relevant taxes and charges include road tolls, parking charges,
taxes on company cars, insurance taxes, costs for periodical inspection
(e.g. Belgium), trafﬁc ﬁnes, local motoring taxes, and taxes for oil storage
(Naess-Schmidt and Winiarczyk, 2009). The corresponding revenues are
often earmarked which makes it easier for citizens to compare beneﬁts
and payments. Various studies (e.g. from Stockholm, London) show that ac-
ceptability of road pricing (and transport-related taxes in general) is higher
if earmarked for transport system improvements (e.g. Oberholzer-Gee and
Weck-Hannemann, 2002; Schuitema and Steg, 2008).
Vehicle-related taxes contribute a substantial share to ﬁscal revenues in
all OECD countries. There is a noteworthy amount of cross-country hetero-
geneity in the types of taxes and the respective contribution of each tax to
the budget (European Commission, 2002). See Fig. 1 for a selected sample
of European countries. Vehicle-related taxes are an important part in all na-
tional budgets as they exceed 5% of overall ﬁscal revenues and can some-
times be as high as 10% (for instance, in the case of Portugal). As
mentioned previously, the VAT on vehicle and vehicle part sales together
with taxes on fuels and lubricants constitute the lion's share, amounting
to over 60–80% of vehicle-related ﬁscal revenues. The remainder are a
varying set of smaller contributions from annual ownership taxes and
road tolls (as in the in case of Austria). Fig. 1 shows that across countries,
vehicle-related tax revenues mostly vary in their composition, while for aFig. 1. Fiscal revenu
(Data sources: ACEA
3given country, both the tax composition and the relative contribution of
vehicle-related taxes to overall ﬁscal revenues are fairly stable. As in
Europe, also in the US, the primary source of ﬁscal revenues of vehicles
are, fuel taxes collected at the federal and state level. These are usually
earmarked for transport-related expenditures (Gomez and Vassallo, 2013).
Vehicle-related ﬁscal revenues in Europe are levied predominantly at
the national level. In Switzerland for example, 60% of revenues are col-
lected at the national level, 35% at the state (i.e. Kanton) level, and 5% at
the municipal level (mainly from parking). Vehicle related local sales
taxes, also referred to as excise tax are a major revenue component for
local governments, especially in the United States. For example, for the mu-
nicipalities in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 73% of vehicle related
revenues are in the form of excise taxes (between 25% and 97%), with Bos-
ton at 41%. For these municipalities, vehicle-related revenues amount to
between 1.5% and 8% of municipal budgets, with Boston (4%) being
close to the average of 3.7% (Mares et al., 2018). In the Netherlands, on av-
erage 10% ofmunicipal income is from parking fees and up to 27% in cities
like Amsterdam (Statline, 2018; CBS, 2014). It is a general phenomenon
that the positive net revenue at the federal level is used to counterbalance
the substantial shortcoming at the municipal level (BFS, 2017). The share
of municipal vehicle revenues in total vehicle revenues varies substantially
in the OECD, from 2.8% in Denmark to 29.7% in New Zealand and with an
average of 7.3% municipal revenue from transport taxes in the OECD.
Transport-related taxes and charges often serve multiple purposes,
which can be assigned to two main categories: revenue generation and
steering motives. In most countries, tax revenues generated by vehicle-
related taxes enter the general budget; in some countries (such as the
United States) taxes are partially earmarked for transport purposes. The
revenue generation motive is also underlined by the relative share of
vehicle-related ﬁscal revenues in overall ﬁscal revenues being rather con-
stant over time for a given country (see Fig. 1). In general, the role of tax in-
struments has changed over time, also for transport taxes. Historically the
main objective of vehicle-related taxes was for general revenue generation
but gradually the (environmental) steering effect has gained more promi-
nence, especially in the EU (Kageson, 2005; Vanrykel et al., 2018).
Steering motives are present when taxes are designed such that they
lead to a reduction of or compensation for negative externalities generatedes from vehicles.
(2015, 2017) and Eurostat (2018).)
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vironmental pollution, and the use of public space. Fuel taxes increase in
the per/km consumption of a car and the distance driven, and hence affect
the demand for vehicle kilometers driven as well as the car type (e.g., Brons
et al., 2008). As registration and circulation taxes are often designed such
that these encourage the purchase and use of more “environmentally
friendly” cars, one can argue that these taxes also have a steering effect in
terms of reducing (environmental) externalities.
Tax instruments have important welfare implications. Three main indi-
cators are commonly used to assess the optimality of revenue generation:
efﬁciency of the tax instrument, the governmental level at which the tax
is collected, aswell as redistribution and the counterbalancing of othermar-
ket distortions.
The efﬁciency of the tax instrument is partially determined by the
steering motive. Fuel taxes, for example, can be a suitable instrument to af-
fect fuel efﬁciency and CO2 emissions (Innes, 1996; Anton-Sarabia and
Hernandez-Trillo 2014; Michielsen et al., 2015). Under certain assump-
tions, efﬁcient prices correspond to the marginal social cost at the efﬁcient
level of trafﬁc (Proost et al., 2002).When accounting for themarginal social
cost of vehicles, the taxes on fuel are twice the optimal level in the United
Kingdom but only half the optimal level in the US (Parry and Small,
2005).5 Urban and peak vehicle travel is currently underpriced which
leads to deadweight losses from severe (i.e. hyper-) congestion (Duranton
and Turner, 2011; Anderson, 2014; Adler and Van Ommeren, 2016; Adler
et al., 2019). Nonetheless, vehicle tax policies can have unintentional con-
sequences beyond the intended (direct) consequences. For example, a
change in registration tax might simultaneously affect nominal circulation
tax levels, demand for vehicle ownership, and vehicle kilometers traveled
per vehicle (INFRAS, 2002).
Vehicle-related taxes may also have distributional impacts. Current fuel
taxes count as regressive (i.e. being a relatively larger burden on low in-
come groups), but some studies suggest that fuel taxes may actually be pro-
portional (see for a discussion, Sterner, 2012). At the local level, transport-
related taxes and charges are often in line with user/polluter-pays-principle
(e.g. parking charges, trafﬁc ﬁnes). Taxes that adhere to the user/polluter-
pays-principle result in more efﬁcient market outcomes in the absence of
other market distortions (Pigou, 1920; Small and Verhoef, 2007). Even if
user fees at the local level of governance (i.e. tolls and parking fees) are po-
tentially regressive and henceforth sometimes criticized for equity reasons,
redistribution should generally be tackled at the national level (Ahmad, and
Brosio, G. (Eds.)., 2015). Overall, taxes should recognize the notion of fair-
ness, differentiation and harmonization as public ﬁnance is normative
(Tresch, 2014).6 Regional governments can use revenues from transport such as parking fees for extra
spending on mobility. Local governments do not receive funding for mobility in the2.2. Expenditures
Vehicle-related government expenditures of OECD countries range be-
tween 0.5% to 2% of GDP and 1.5% to 5% of overall government budget
(i.e. ﬁscal expenditures). The list of expenditures towards land-based trans-
port is broad and there are substantial differences in the spending allocation
between countries. It is challenging to ﬁnd comparable data, as they accrue
at different governmental levels, depending on regulations. Therefore, as an
example case, we use the Netherlands for which good data exists and point
out where statements can be generalized.
In 2017, the Netherlands spent 2.9% (€8.9 billion) of public budget on
land-based transport, see Fig. 2. Construction andmaintenance of highways
and national roads constitute the lion's share and usually account for >50%
of expenditures, exceeding the size of other public infrastructure spending,
such as aviation, water, rail and energy. In theNetherlands, highway expen-
ditures make up 56% of ﬁscal expenditures on land-based transport.5 With there are restrictions on the implementation of usage-dependent taxes, taxes on the
purchase of vehicles are desirable (Fullerton andWest, 2002, 2010; De Borger, 2001). Efﬁcient
pricing needs to consider capacity restrictions of the road network and the resulting conges-
tion. See Bjertnæs (2017) for a recent example considering the efﬁcient combination of taxes
on fuel and vehicles.
4Another 18% are spent on railways and on trafﬁc rule enforcement. By
comparison, in the US, 4.8% ($160 billion) of total ﬁscal revenues are
spent on the highway system, with 28% contributed by the federal level
and 72% by state and local governments (Musick and Petz, 2015).
Regional governments contribute 12% of public ﬁnance towards road
construction and maintenance in the Netherlands. This might seem rela-
tively small, however, these 12% constitutes one-ﬁfth (19%) of the overall
regional budget. Together with public transport, almost half (42%) of re-
gional ﬁnances are spent on transport (CBS, 2017).6 Subsidies to public
transport are usually around 40% of operating costs in Western countries
where themain economic reason for subsidizing public transport is a reduc-
tion of car externalities (Parry and Small, 2009; Anderson, 2014; Adler and
Van Ommeren, 2016).We ﬁnd a similar picture for Germanywhere 50% of
transport expenditures are attributed to roads, 23% for rail, 10% on local
public transport paid 60% on the national level, 27% by cities and 10%
by regions (Link and Kunert, 2017).
Another cost to the government, which is typically notmentioned in sta-
tistics as the ones presented in Fig. 2, as it only accrues indirectly, are sub-
sidies to electric vehicle sales in the form of tax exemptions, tax credits and
additional advantages such as waivers of parking fees, charges and tolls.2.3. Summary
In summary, a substantial share of government expenditures and reve-
nues is transport related. On average, fuel taxes and transport-related
VAT contributions make up 70% of vehicle-related taxes. Typically, ﬁscal
revenues at the local level, such as from parking, are relatively low in abso-
lute terms, but often constitute a substantial share of revenues for local gov-
ernments (up to 30%). Expenditures on road-based transport make up a
substantial share in the ﬁscal budgets of national governments (typically,
about 1–3%) and regional governments (typically, about 3–30%).
There are similarities in the percentage of public revenues and expendi-
tures associatedwith road transport between countries, but the governmen-
tal level atwhich revenues are collected, as well as the type and justiﬁcation
for the taxes differ substantially across countries. In countries such as the
US, expenditures at the national and state levels are similar in size. In
many European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands, spending
at the national level ismuch greater that at the local level. Transport related
ﬁscal expenditures amount to a large share of overall regional budgets.
They also take up a large share of expenditures at the supra-national
level: almost 9.4% of the EU budget is spent on transport through
earmarked cohesion funds.7
When comparing the level of revenues with expenditures, Gomez and
Vassallo (2013) ﬁnd that EU countries generate enough revenues from
transport to subsidize other non-transport-related expenditures, whereas
in the US the public sector subsidizes transport-related expenditures. The
US road transport system has been in a funding crisis for the past two de-
cades and has a continuous shortfall of about $126 billion per year (Oh
and Sinha, 2010; Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, 2012). One reason is that
federal fuel taxes have not been inﬂation adjusted since 1993 and that cap-
ital spending is lower than the required $126 billion/year to maintain the
federal highway system's performance (Morris, 2006; Congressional
Budget Ofﬁce, 2012). The US earmarks approximately 50% of ﬁscal reve-
nues from vehicles for road expenditures but for the EU it is only around
10% (Gomez and Vassallo, 2013).8Netherlands. 4% of the national budget for mobility is from the EU.
7 For the 2007 to, 2014 period, the EU earmarked 10 billion per year in cohesion funds di-
rected at road infrastructure and €20.35 billion in Transport European Network program
(TEN-T) (Transport and Environment, 2011).
8 Even so earmarking is uncommon in the EU, expenditures decisions often take revenues
into account (INFRAS, 2002).
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Fig. 2. Fiscal expenditures on ground based transport in the Netherlands.
(Data sources: Wijnen and Stroeker, 2009 and Ministry of Infrastructure, Public Works and Water Management, 2014.)
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3.1. Factors affecting adoption and future outlook
This section describes the characteristics of ACES and discusses the ex-
pected timeframe of their introduction. The timeframe is a subject debated
by the industry (e.g. Waymo, Tesla) as well as by public and private re-
search institutes (Silberg et al., 2012; Saffo and Bergbaum, 2013; KiM,
2015; Kaas et al., 2016; Ranft et al., 2016; Bloomberg, 2017).9 ACES tech-
nologies (i.e. automation, connectivity, electriﬁcation, and shared owner-
ship) are highly interdependent, but have emerged at different times and
are often discussed independently. In this section, we discuss these technol-
ogies in turn and motivate why these are separately, but even more so
jointly relevant to public ﬁnance.
Autonomous vehicles are a broad category for vehicles that have the ca-
pacity to drive without human input (and hence are often referred to as
driverless or self-driving vehicles). There is a continuous spectrum of vehi-
cle autonomy. For this paper's purpose, we regard vehicles as autonomous
when these can operate longer distances without the assistance of a driver
(broadly in-line with Level 3 classiﬁcation and above, see SAE
International, 2016). Autonomous vehicles at level 3 are mostly self-
driving, however, might require a driver intervention in speciﬁc situations,
implying that a designated driver is required at all times. They are currently
road tested and expected to become commercially available before 2020. Au-
tonomous ride-sharing depends on full-automation (level 4 and above)which
enables driverless mobility and is forecasted to be available on the market
starting in the 2020s (Navigant Research, 2016). There is a wide consensus
that autonomous vehicle diffusion is imminent, and that diffusion will take
the form of a Sigmoid curve, where initial adaptation is slow but followed
by years of rapid adaptation, and that by 2040 the majority of vehicles in
the Western world will have the capability to drive autonomously (Rogers,
1995; Leech et al., 2015; Kaas. et al., 2016; Ranft et al., 2016).
For this paper's purpose, we regard vehicles as autonomous when these
can operate longer distances without the assistance of a driver (broadly in-
linewith Level 3 classiﬁcation and above, see SAE International, 2016). Au-
tonomous vehicles at level 3 while in the optimal case do not require driver
intervention, still allow for driver intervention in emergency situations9 Earlier studies assumed later introduction dates than more recent studies as technological
and regulation barriers were overcome faster than expected. Newer, Anglo-Saxon studies also
point to a much more rapid adaptation and earlier market saturation with most studies
expecting western countries' car ﬂeets to be almost entirely autonomous by the year 2050.
5hence a designated driver is required at all times. Level 3 vehicles are cur-
rently road tested and are expected to become commercially available be-
fore 2020.
Despite a slow start, the diffusion of electric and hybrid vehicles has rap-
idly increased in the last few years. Globally, the total number of electric
cars was >5.1 million in 2018, an increase of 2 million since 2017 (IEA,
2019). China remains the world's largest market, with nearly 1.1 million
cars sold in 2018. With 1.2 million electric cars, Europe remained the sec-
ond largest electric car market, followed by the US with 1.1 million (IEA,
2019).10 In Europe, Norway remains the leader in terms of market share,
with 46% of new electric car sales in 2018, followed by Iceland with 16%
and Sweden at 8%. National policies have a major inﬂuence on diffusion
and ambitions of policy makers and the industry are high, not least due to
the goals set in the Paris Climate Agreement. For instance, since 2019
Volvo only produces hybrid and fully electric cars as a commitment to an
electric car future.11 The German Federal Council (Bundesrat) declared
the intention to permit only emission-free vehicles from 2030 onwards
EU-wide.12 Britain, France and China have set similar targets for the electri-
ﬁcation of vehicles in line with the Paris Climate Agreement. Results
concerning stimulating effects on electric and hybrid vehicle sales are
mixed, with sales in Europe averaging 1.5%, the US 5% and Japan 20%
of new vehicles (Zhou et al., 2015). For instance, the Dutch government
exempted plug-in hybrids from registration and circulation tax for a 3-
year period, provided scrapping bonuses for high pollution vehicles, and
waved charging and parking fees. This stimulus was accompanied by a
5% increase in electric vehicle sales in 2013 at a cost of €500 million,
which is 0.18% of ﬁscal expenditures and 5% of transport expenditures
(RVO, 2013; Volkskrant, 2014). Other important factors favorable to elec-
tric vehicle diffusion include the substantial cost reductions for batteries
(and accompanying regulations), improvements in chargers (such as high-
power chargers up to 600 kW and interests in mega-chargers of 1 MW),
and the redesigning of vehicle manufacturing platforms to use simpler de-
sign architecture which take advantage of much fewer parts in EVs than
ICE vehicles (IEA, 2019). By 2025, batteries are expected to be based on
cathode chemistries less dependent on cobalt, increasing their energy den-
sity and lowering energy costs by a factor of 10 within the next 10 years
(The Economist, 2017). Taken together, lower battery costs and innovative10 https://www.iea.org/publications/reports/globalevoutlook2019/
11 https://www.media.volvocars.com/global/en-gb/media/pressreleases/210058/volvo-
cars-to-go-all-electric
12 https://www.bundesrat.de/DE/plenum/plenum-kompakt/16/948/070.html?view=
main%5BDrucken%5D
Fig. 3. Consensus forecast ACES diffusion.
(Sources: Underwood (2014); Ihs markit (2014); Leech et al. (2015); KiM (2015)
Frost and Sullivan (2016); Kaas et al. (2016); McKerracher et al. (2016); Ranft et al
(2016); Walker and Johnson (2016); Schiller et al. (2017); Schmidt et al. (2018);
Litman (2017); Bloomberg (2017); ING (2017); Morgan Stanley Research (2017)
Currie (2018).)
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between EV and ICE vehicles by 2025 (McKinsey and Company, 2019). By
mid-century, 90% of vehicle sales are expected to be electric (Morgan
Stanley, 2017). Autonomous cars are likely to be electric. A main reason
is that electric cars are (so far) more expensive in their production, but
the operating costs per km are comparably lower. Electric cars will thus
be especially favorable for users or groups of users with high mileage,
such as it is likely to be the case with autonomous cars in ﬂeet ownership.
Conversely, electric cars may beneﬁt from automation, especially if they
are capable of accessing charging stations and completing the charging
without need for human assistance.
The concept of shared-ownership of vehicles comprises a number of re-
lated services such as ride-hailing (e.g. Lyft, Mytaxi), ride-sharing (incl.
carpooling, e.g. BlaBla car), shared ownership (Car2go, Greenwheels) and
Mobility-as-a-Service (MaaS).13 These sharing concepts are highly compat-
ible with autonomous electric driving and are likely to become more com-
mon once autonomous cars are on the market. In line with an increase in
shared transportation, private ownership of cars is likely to decline for the
following two reasons. First, autonomous cars will be more expensive
than traditional cars (due to the additionally required equipment such as
high-quality sensors), and hence ownership only pays off with high mile-
age. Conversely, shared ownership of autonomous vehicles is expected to
yield cost savings to users who travel <10,000 km/year which is almost
half of all car travelers in Europe (Odyssee-Mure, 2015; Litman, 2017). Sec-
ond, a critical mass of users for shared vehicles will probably be easy to
reach, due to the expected convenience and affordability (the operating
costs of shared services are expected to be low, especially if no driver is
needed any longer). The resulting Mohring effect (Mohring, 1972) will lead
to reductions in waiting time. All these reasons point towards ACES being
to a large extent in shared (ﬂeet) ownership. Not only car-sharing, but also
ride-sharing is likely to become more common with the introduction of
ACES: coordination among vehicles will becomemuch easier (even route ad-
justments during the drive can be made easily by an underlying algorithm),
and the fact that travel time can be used more productively renders detours
for pick-ups and drop-offs less costly. Hence, once transport in shared auton-
omous vehicles is more affordable than in private vehicles, price-sensitive
users, in particular in cities can be expected to switch to the former.
In a stated preference study concerning thewillingness to pay for shared
and connected autonomous vehicles in Austin (Texas), 41% of respondents
were willing to use shared autonomous cars at least once a week and an ad-
ditional 15% as their regular transport option under the assumption of cost
parity with regular vehicles (Bansal et al., 2016). Another study by Cornet
et al. (2012) found that a third of urban Germans are predicted to be car-
sharing users by 2022 and that attitudes are gradually changing with
87%of respondents aware of the sharing concept and 31.5% of respondents
stating that they have gathered further information on car-sharing. Car-
sharing has seen double digit annual growth in proﬁtability since 2005
(Cornet et al., 2012). Currently, 50% of global car-sharing users are in the
EU, with an annual compound growth rate of around 20% in users
projected to reach 16 million users in 2020 (Schiller et al., 2017). Poten-
tially, by 2030, every tenth vehicle sold is shared through some sort of
car-sharing scheme (Kaas et al., 2016).
By 2030, ride-sharing is expected to increase substantially, possibly re-
placing two-thirds of the current taxi market (Burgstaller et al., 2017).
Their forecast predicts that 4% of inner city trips will be conducted via
ride-hailing services in 2030 relying on one in fourteen cars produced (7%
of total car production vs. 3% currently).14 However, it can be assumed
that shared, autonomous transportwill be accessible to 70%of population liv-
ing in urban centers by 2035 (Walker and Johnson, 2016). Chen et al. (2016)
expect that each shared autonomous electric vehicle can replace 3.7–6.813 We deﬁneMaaS as an integration of transport services that provides multi-modal mobility
without the necessity for private ownership of the transport mode(s).
14 Private car penetration in cities would decline from 31% in 2015 to 27% in 2030. Ride-
hailing cars account for 2% of the overall ﬂeet by 2030, vs. 0.3% today (Burgstaller et al.,
2017).
6.
;privately owned vehicles but that cost competitiveness crucially hinges on
recharging automation. Another study projects that MaaS will account for
40% in 2035 and reach around 80% in the decade between 2040 and 2050
(Schmidt et al., 2018). Car- and ride-sharing are predicted to be predomi-
nantly attractive in urban settings due to price advantages from economies
of scale. Waiting times for ACES are expected to be substantially longer in
less densely populated areas (e.g., Bischoff and Maciejewski, 2016).
Connectivity and digitalization are a pre-requisite for efﬁcient car- and
ride-sharing. For the actual operation of ACES, the case is less clear. For in-
stance, Alphabet, the parent company of Google and Waymo, intends to
keep ACES not continuously connected to the internet to prevent security
threats whereas companies such as Audi and BMWplan cars that communi-
cate with each other and with the infrastructure (Condliffe, 2017). Connec-
tivity certainly plays a large role in reducing trafﬁc externalities and in
making congestion more predictable (Hensher, 2018).
To illustrate the above discussed trends, we combine 16 studies includ-
ing 25 forecasts for vehicle automation, electriﬁcation and sharing in the
developed world to a consensus forecast, shown in Fig. 3. For simplicity
and tractability, we assume an equal probability for all forecasts that pre-
dict vehicle automation at and above level SAE 3 automation. Although in-
dividual forecasts vary greatly, the consensus forecast exhibits similar
growth rates of the three technologies. Automation, connectivity and elec-
triﬁcation take off somewhat earlier, grow faster and reach an almost com-
plete saturation level by 2040, whereas vehicle sharing is predicted to reach
60% of new vehicle sales by 2035. Unsurprisingly, more recent forecasts
have an information advantage over older publications, and the consensus
forecast only approximately follows an (s-shaped) sigmoid transition path
usually associated with diffusion of innovations, which is not at least due
to the aggregation of the underlying forecasts. Also, not all forecasts include
predictions until 2050, so after 2040 fewer forecasts are used and almost
none of the studies concerning sharing include predictions past 2030. An
important takeaway from Fig. 3, is that ACES diffusion happens gradually,
implying that ACES are expected to operate in systems with a substantial
share of conventional non-ACES vehicles for multiple decades.
As ACES are (initially) more expensive than cars with combustion en-
gines, it is expected that ACES will penetrate the transport service sector
as well as the luxury private car market ﬁrst. The expected higher price of
ACES compared to conventional cars suggests that metropolitan areas
might see a faster diffusion of ACES than rural areas, due to the higher po-
tential for shared ownership in urban areas (McKerracher et al., 2016). On
the other hand, rural areas might be the ﬁrst to beneﬁt from ACES technol-
ogy due to the higher technology requirements that comewith urbanmixed
trafﬁc compared to rural roads and highways, which might slow down
15 Platooning on highways can increase capacity by up to 500% but according to a study by
the Boston Consulting group, Amsterdam and similar cities requires substantial road capacity
upgrades to allow for autonomous vehicles. http://nltimes.nl/2016/10/11/amsterdam-ready-
handle-self-driving-cars-bcg.
16 Mobility options do not necessarily have to decrease in the absence of public transit. For
instance, Innisﬁl, a 36,000-inhabitant town near Toronto, is relying on Uber to provide last-
mile public transit services (May, 2017).
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2018). Regarding electric cars, subsidies and tax exemptions have led to in-
creases in electric vehicle sales in recent years (for instance in the
Netherlands, Austria, and Norway), in particular for luxury car models
used for business purposes. In the freight sector, electric vehicles are espe-
cially sought after for inner city deliveries where regulations on pollution
are likely to become stricter.
3.2. Fiscal aspects of ACES
We discuss the expected ﬁscal effects of ACES by summarizing the ﬁnd-
ings of existing studies on the direct and indirect effects of ACES under the as-
sumption that current (transport and ﬁscal) policies remain in place. While
the effects cannot be predicted precisely due to the inherent uncertainties as-
sociated with technological innovation, their direction can be anticipated.
ACES have numerous ﬁscal implications, which are highly interdependent
comparable to transmission through ‘ripple effects’ (Milakis et al., 2017b).
3.3. Decrease in fuel tax revenues and increase in electricity tax revenues
ACES are expected to lead to a substantial decrease in tax revenues from
combustion fuels (as well as VAT and/or sales taxes levied on top of the fuel
price and the associated fuel tax), due to electriﬁcation of vehicles and efﬁ-
ciency increases. In the US and the Netherlands, even low levels of hybrid
and electric vehicle use have already reduced fuel tax revenues sufﬁciently
to alarm governments (Alan, 2018; Rtl Nieuws, 2019). By 2030, new car
sales are expected to be close to 100% electric in Europe and the US, and
up to 50% globally (McKerracher et al., 2016). Under these assumptions,
demand for vehicle fuels is expected to decline by as much as 75% between
2015 and 2030 (McKerracher et al., 2016).
In parallel, electricity demand will go up. By 2030, electric vehicles are
expected to account for 3% of global electricity demand (McKerracher
et al., 2016). Annual electricity consumption from EVs is projected to in-
crease from 6TWh in 2016 to 1800TWh by 2040, adding 8% to global elec-
tricity demand by 2040 (Bloomberg, 2017).
However, foregone ﬁscal revenues due to declining fuel tax revenues
are unlikely to be counterbalanced by higher tax revenues from electricity
taxes: oil products for travel (i.e. combustibles) are currently taxed >10
times higher than oil products for electricity production in the OECD
(2013) per ton CO2 emission. Coal, a major input to electricity generation
in countries such as the US and Germany has an even lower tax rate per
ton CO2 emission than oil used for heating. As a result of electriﬁcation,
tax revenues from combustibles are thus expected to decline noticeably
(Wakeley et al., 2008; NSTIFC, 2009; Pisarski and Wachs, 2012).
At the vehicle level, efﬁciency gains can possibly also be achieved due to
automation (independently from the engine), due to more efﬁcient routing,
platooning and start-stop avoidance. An overview study by Brown et al.
(2013) suggest efﬁciency gains from these three factors in the range of 5%,
10% and 15%, respectively. Silberg et al. (2012)ﬁnd that platooning could re-
duce highway fuel use by up to 20% solely due to the decreased drag coefﬁ-
cient from drafting (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2015). However, Gawron et al.
(2018) argue that the net efﬁciency gain may actually be much smaller
(around 9% in their base case), as the system components enabling autono-
mous driving (computing power, additional weight, etc.) may lead to an in-
crease in power consumption of 3–20% compared to non-automated vehicles.
At the systems level, changes in energy consumption from vehicle
usage, and their effect on revenues from taxes imposed on electricity, are
difﬁcult to predict, and closely related to the future demand for ACES-
based mobility, the extent of sharing, as well as operational characteristics
that determine the extent of idle rides for relocation (location adjustment
for demand reasons), recharging and parking purposes.
3.4. Decrease in registration and circulation tax revenues
Currently, even during peak hours, only 12%ofUS cars are in use (Silberg
et al., 2012). In large metropolitan areas, 95% of trips tend to be shareable7(Tachet et al., 2017). For Lisbon, if 10% of the vehicle ﬂeet were ACES,
these could supply all transport when public transportation is left in place
(Martinez and Christ, 2015). Similarﬁgures apply to Austin (Liu et al., 2017).
Car-sharing and ride-sharing may lead to a decrease in the number of
registered vehicles in the Western world, as a smaller vehicle ﬂeet can pro-
vide similar or even higher levels of mobility (Fagnant and Kockelman,
2014;Martinez and Christ, 2015; Schonberger and Gutmann, 2013). Global
vehicle sales might, however, still increase due to an increase in motoriza-
tion rate. In theWesternWorld, a decrease in registered vehicles is likely to
translate into a decline in registration and circulation tax revenues given
that current taxation rules remain in place. The decline in registration tax
revenues might be dampened if car utilization and in turn the car turnover
rate increase (Burgstaller et al., 2017).
3.5. Public sector - roads, energy, telecommunication and transit
Investments in infrastructure (e.g. telecommunication and energy) and
subsidies to public transportmay increase with the introduction of ACES, in
particular in the short and medium run.
The electriﬁcation of the vehicle ﬂeet requires investments into smart
electricity grids. EVs are expected to increase global electricity consump-
tion moderately (until 2040 by 8% according to Bloomberg, 2017). How-
ever, they will contribute to peak-load proﬁles, in turn requiring
additional storage solutions and efﬁcient grid management at the operator
level, as well as policies that encourage off-peak charging to prevent power
supply and ﬁnancial shortfalls (Bloomberg, 2017). Research by Morgan
Stanley (2017) predicts that global investments of $2.7 trillion are required
to prepare the power grid for 500 million electric vehicles until 2040.
Under this calculation, the US and the EU, accounting each for one quarter
of the global vehicle ﬂeet would need to invest around $250 billion (1.5%
of GDP) annually until 2050. By comparison, revenue gains from electricity
provision and taxation of electricity are negligible (see the previous subsec-
tion on fuel revenues and a study conducted by OECD, 2013).
ACESmight affect the costs of road infrastructuremaintenance and con-
struction. A higher number of VKT (due to induced demand) is generally as-
sociated with higher costs for road maintenance (Clark et al., 2017). In
terms of construction, ACES may require less costly safety features such a
road shoulders and trafﬁc signs, as well as lower investments in noise pro-
tectionmeasures due to electric engines being quieter than fuel combustion
engines (Silberg et al., 2012; Fagnant and Kockelman, 2014). Moreover,
ACES are expected to use road capacity more efﬁciently by lowering the
necessary safety distance between vehicles, and thereby improving road ca-
pacity, and reducing the need for new road construction. However, making
ACES use road space more efﬁciently may require vehicle communication
through connectivity and a high market penetration (>40%) of autono-
mous vehicles (van Arem et al., 2006). The cost for infrastructure that is
necessary for vehicle connectivity, in particular telecommunication tech-
nologies, may be high and in constant need of upgrading with advances
in technology (Silberg et al., 2012). Therefore, the effect of ACES on public
expenditures on road construction and maintenance is fairly unclear for
lower penetration rates (Eugensson et al., 2013; Wagner et al., 2014). At
considerable ACES market penetration, Silberg et al. (2012) expect a
small, but signiﬁcant decline in infrastructure spending by 10%.15
Public transport scenarios for ACES are highly speculative, since ACES
and public transport are not exclusive concepts. In the future, ACES could
serve an important role in public transport. For example, the problem of
how to travel the “last mile” of a journey after a shared long-distance travel
could be solved through innovative MaaS concepts (Begg, 2014).16 Low
density and low quality public transport is expected to be replaced by
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base cannot be recovered through higher fares that would accelerate the
downward service spiral and increases in already large subsidies. Current
subsidies to local transit in Europe are between 40 and 60% of operating
cost with even higher relative subsidies in most cities in the US. Also,
long-distance rail transit requires large up-front infrastructure investments
with large investment horizons (+30 years) that is going to come under
pressure from ACES (Silberg et al., 2012).173.6. Macroeconomic effects and ﬁscal consequences
ACES can (indirectly) affect revenues from large-base taxes such as the
income tax, corporate tax, and capital gains tax, as well public expendi-
tures, for instance for unemployment beneﬁts. Such effects may accrue
via the labor market, via the taxation of car manufacturers and ﬂeet opera-
tors, or via ACES' impacts on the wider economy (including the freight sec-
tor). At this point, however, there remains a high level of uncertainty
concerning the macroeconomic effects of ACES, not least because the out-
comes depend on public policies.18
It is generally expected that there will be an overall positive effect of
ACES on productivity and GDP. The forecasted effects are highly specula-
tive and tend to be in a range of an adding 4–12% to GDP in the long run.
This is in line with a 0.15% increase in GDP growth rate from autonomous
vehicles between 2021 and 2050 for the EU and the US (Shanker et al.,
2013; Ranft et al., 2016). Productivity gains depend on mobility gains but
also on cost savings (detailed throughout Section 3, see also Shanker
et al., 2013). Socio-economic beneﬁts of autonomous vehicles are expected
to be around £50 billion (2% of GDP in 2018) per year by 2030 for the
United Kingdom (Leech et al., 2015). A recent study by Karpilow and
Winston (2016) expects for California an annual boost to the GDP growth
rate by 1.8% and an increase in annual labor earnings by more than $100
billion, under the condition that ACES can reduce congestion to a mini-
mum. Note that most studies focusing on macroeconomic effects of auto-
mated driving combine freight and passenger transport, also because the
macroeconomic effects are hard to disentangle between freight and passen-
ger transport.
ACES may strongly affect the labor market, most evidently by reducing
the number of jobs in the transport and logistics sector (Shanker et al.,
2013; Davidson and Spinoulas, 2015; Guerra, 2016; Alonso Raposo et al.,
2018). To underline the size of this issue, the EU transport sector employs
5% of the workforce and an additional 2% for employment in related sec-
tors of the economy (ACEA, 2018), and truck drivers (and related jobs)
are the most common profession in the majority of US states (NPR,
2015). By 2030, ride-sharing is supposed to increase eight-fold and replace
two-thirds of current taxi market, rendering potentially 2.6 million drivers
globally redundant, according to a study conducted by Burgstaller et al.
(2017). Additional jobs thatmight be replaced include vehiclemaintenance
staff, employees at driving schools, employees of insurance companies,
park and trafﬁc surveillance staff, and even emergency room staff (Hörl
et al., 2016).19 The reduction in employment is expected to predominantly
affect low-income jobs. New jobs are expected to be created in the more ad-
vanced tech sectors, requiring a different skill set (Alonso Raposo et al.,
2018) and potentially leading to a labor market polarization (see
Thuemmel, 2018).17 High speedmass transport services, e.g. high-speed rail, might have sufﬁcient comparative
advantage to autonomous vehicles rendering complementary to ACES. Local public transit ser-
vices, however, are likely to be close substitutes to ACES and thus to suffer substantially under
ACES competition. This will increase pressure on local public ﬁnance that subsidizes these ser-
vices or alternatively these services are no longer provided.
18 Bertoncello and Wee (2015), for instance, speculate that ACES bring about changes in
spending patterns because of more leisure time from reductions in travel costs and therefore
a higher disposable income.
19 Although the car industry is already highly automated, there are concerns that even more
jobs will be lost because EVs are much simpler to assemble than cars with combustion engines
(The Economist, 2017).
8At least for a certain period, the automation of labor in the transport sec-
tor is predicted to progress faster than new jobs in this sector will be cre-
ated, in particular in the absence of concrete policy measures. The ITF
(2017) proposes the introduction of a licensing system on ACES in freight
in order to slow down the introduction of ACES, thereby supporting a
labor market transition that avoids major unemployment spills. The labor
market outcomes of ACES will also depend on public policy regarding
skill upgrading through education (Ranft et al., 2016). The topic relates to
the larger discussion on how automatization will affect the labor market
and society as a whole (Frey and Osborne, 2017), and which measures
should be taken (e.g., basic income, higher taxes on capital).20
The negative employment effects may be partially counterbalanced by
better matching in the labor market due to a higher acceptance for longer
commuting distances and for higher mobility in general.21 An increase in
mobility and therefore an improvement in accessibility has beneﬁted the
United States and Europe substantially in the last decades (Duranton
et al., 2014; Adler et al., forthcoming).
3.7. Public ﬁnance policy in the advent of ACES
3.7.1. Differentiated road tolls
Currently, 1% of GDP is lost in travel time due to congestion each year
in the EU-28 (European Commission, 2011; CEBR, 2014). Especially urban
centers are affected by congestion. The TomTom trafﬁc index shows that
congestion levels in urban areas are deteriorating globally, with larger
urban areas experiencing average travel times 66% above free ﬂow levels
and up to twice as long for peak hours.22
ACES are predicted to have a large effect on the vehicle kilometers trav-
eled (VKT), especially in the medium and long run (Litman, 2015).
Trommer et al. (2016) estimate that autonomous vehicles are likely to in-
crease total vehicle travel by 3–9% by 2035, and passenger miles might
even increase by 25% (Fagnant and Kockelman, 2014; Martinez and
Christ, 2015; McKerracher et al., 2016). For the United States, vehicle kilo-
meters traveled are predicted to grow by 14% from non-drivers alone,
which might add 40% of VKT (Brown et al., 2013; Harper et al., 2016).
The main reasons behind the expected increase in VKT is induced demand
due to more efﬁcient, comfortable, inexpensive and possibly also reliable23
provision of mobility services, and current steering instruments becoming
widely obsolete: taxes on fuel will lose their effect on electric vehicles,
with electricity being signiﬁcantly less taxed than gasoline, and parking
charges will not prevent autonomous vehicles from entering areas with
land scarcity as they can keep cruising or park elsewhere (Ostermeijer
et al., 2018). Also parking charges will become less effective, as automated
vehicles can drive to cheaper parking locations or keep cruising (in both
cases creating additional VKT). Cheaper car-based mobility might also
lead to people switching from transport modes with more efﬁcient space
usage (public transport, cycling or walking) to ACES. ACES will also attract
new user groups such as the elderly, disabled, and young people, who cur-
rently tend to be restricted in engaging in independent mobility. Diffusion
of ACES will also lead to additional and longer trips because of increased
travel comfort, low costs and the fact that travel time can be used produc-
tively. Moreover, idle rides will not only take place in order for ACES to
ﬁnd cheap or even unpriced parking, but also for re-charging purposes, or
to optimize vehicle availability according to expected demand patterns
(empty ACES have no value of time, i.e. they do not experience disutility
from spending time in congested conditions as human drivers do, see for in-
stance Kaddoura and Bischoff, 2017).20 Concrete measures targeted more speciﬁcally at the introduction of ACES can be found in
the “Driving Future Platform” of the EU Parliament: https://connectedautomateddriving.eu/
event/4th-driving-future-event
21 Karpilow and Winston (2016) estimate that a reduction in congestion may lead to an in-
crease in employment by up to 15% in California.
22 https://www.tomtom.com/en_gb/trafﬁcindex/list?citySize=LARGE&continent=
ALL&country=ALL
23 Hensher (2018) argues that with a high penetration rate of AVs congestion will become
more predictable.
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cially in urban areas and whenmarket penetration rates of automated vehi-
cles are low (Smith, 2012; Kaddoura and Bischoff, 2017; Adler, 2017;
Pernestål Brenden and Kristoffersson, 2018). For instance, Calvert et al.
(2017) found that low-level automated vehicles inmixed trafﬁc have a neg-
ative effect on trafﬁcﬂow and road capacity, and that improvements in traf-
ﬁc ﬂow occur at penetration rates above 70%; above 50% autonomous
vehicles penetration, gains of around 5–15% in capacity at bottlenecks
and 15%–20% without bottlenecks can be expected (see Milakis et al.,
2015, 2017a for an overview).24 While city centers might become denser
(also because of the availability of affordable, convenient transport in the
form of ACES, see Bischoff and Maciejewski, 2016), ACES might also con-
tribute to a reduction in urban density on the fringes of the city and an in-
crease in urban sprawl, as a reduction in the value of travel time savings
might render longer-distance commutes more attractive. Thakur et al.
(2016) simulate that suburbs that are further than 30 km fromMelbourne's
central business district might increase in population by 2–4% due to vehi-
cle automation.
We argue that the likely increase in vehicle kilometers traveled (VKT)
(and associated consequences, such as increased urban sprawl) can be
countered efﬁciently by using (differentiated) road tolls (Smith, 2012;
Adler, 2017, Adler et al., 2019; Bloomberg Philantropies, 2017 make simi-
lar arguments). Road tolls have been advocated for decades, starting with
Vickrey (1969), with the aim of internalizing the externalities resulting
from transportation. Due to road tolls being usage-dependent, they are
more effective in reducing environmental and congestion externalities
than registration and circulation taxes, especially if they are differentiated
in time and space (Langer et al., 2017; Vanrykel et al., 2018). Road tolls
also tend to be a better instrument for raising revenue than fuel taxes be-
cause travel is less elastic than fuel consumption (Parry and Small, 2005).
Moreover, there is the possibility of a ‘double beneﬁt’ and ‘virtuous circle’
depending on the use of revenue (Small, 2005).
However, road tolls have been successfully introduced in a few cities
only (among others, in Singapore, London, Stockholm) and few road
stretches (e.g., toll lanes in the US) so far. Most of the existing road toll
implementations have high transaction costs, are second- or third-best,
and lack public acceptance. The latter is especially true before their intro-
duction (as opposed to after the introduction), when congestion is not con-
sidered a sizable problem by citizens, and when the use of the toll revenues
is unclear and not earmarked for transport-related purposes (see De Borger
and Proost, 2012).
With the advent of ACES, the problems associated with the current toll-
ing schemes are likely to be substantially reduced. Lower transaction costs
can be achieved from advancements in software and digitalization (e.g.
ubiquitous GPS tracking of ACES and a close to 100% smartphone penetra-
tion rate).25 The same technologies allow for new, more targeted tax instru-
ments with high ﬂexibility that can be designedwith the aim of limiting the
presence of negative externalities (see Section 3.3), and allowing for a
system-wide tax scheme rather than a tax scheme applied to selected road
(stretches), which in turn limits spillover effects (i.e., trafﬁc from tolled
(main) roads being shifted to untolled (local) roads) (Eliasson, 2014;
Calthrop and Proost, 1998; Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2018). The tolls can,
for instance, be set such that they take into account trip length, time of
day, vehicle type (or even the occupancy rate) as well as the type of roads
used along the trip (see also Hörl et al., 2016). Providers may then offer cli-
ents to choose between algorithms that select between cheaper and faster
routes (Ostrovsky and Schwarz, 2018).
Also, a higher degree of acceptance of future road pricing schemes with
ACES (compared to current and past road pricing schemes), and in turn a24 Note that there are studies that predict much larger capacity gains such as Pinjari et al.
(2013) who estimate that connected AVs will cause a 22% increase in highway capacity at
50%market penetration, 50% capacity increase at 80%market penetration, and 80% increase
at 100% market capacity.
25 “[…] theory of optimal tax systems […] embraces the insights of optimal taxation but also
considers the technology of raising taxes and the constraints placed upon tax policy by that
technology” (Slemrod, 1989).
9higher political viability seems achievable. A main reason is that with
shared ownership, the tolls may be directly charged to the individual trav-
eler (and voter), but to themobility service providers and/or ﬂeet owners of
ACES (Hensher, 2018). Depending on the market structure and demand
elasticity these service providers will then impose these costs partially or
fully on the consumers. Alternatively, even if road charges are directly
charged to the consumer, the toll collection will be very convenient to
users, as GPS-tracking of vehicles will avoid the necessity for toll booths.
Another argument brought forward by Ostrovsky and Schwarz (2018), is
that, unlike in the Vickrey bottleneck model where the individual drivers
are equally well off after introducing a time-differentiated road toll (before
they encountered the same cost by waiting in the queue), they are better off
in a scenariowith ride-sharing: without tolls each driver pays the entire cost
in terms of waiting time; with tolls and if the ride is shared with at least an-
other person, they pay less than half of the costs associated with the
untolled equilibrium. Moreover, citizens can probably be convinced that
fuel tax revenues need to be replaced by other tax revenues when ﬂeet elec-
triﬁcation proceeds, at least as long as the average cost of travel is still lower
than or equal to the costs associated with the pre-ACES era.
Besides steering motives, revenue motives can also be highly relevant
for the implementation of tolling schemes, as revenues from other
vehicle-related tax bases (fuel, registration, circulation taxes) will decrease
(as discussed in Section 3).26 The potential tax base for road tolls is large,
while it is fairly small for registration and circulation taxes (in particular
if car- and ride-sharing become more common). Earmarking the toll reve-
nues for transport purposes will be beneﬁcial for acceptance reasons (and
can be justiﬁed with required infrastructure investments for ACES); how-
ever, (at least part of) the road toll revenues might also be transferred to
the general budget of the tax levying governance body for ﬁnancing other
public expenses (similarly, to the current use of fuel taxes revenues, in par-
ticular in European countries).
Clearly, measures on the supply side (e.g., restricting the number of
ACES) are also possible in order to avoid an increase in negative externali-
ties, in particular from increased road congestion. Besides not being opti-
mal from a welfare perspective, it is questionable whether they can be
sustained in the long-run, if citizens and ﬂeet providers lobby for better ac-
cess to ACES. While restrictions in the number of ACES within a speciﬁc
area do not create ﬁscal revenues per se, the licenses to operate ACES (at
the level of the ﬂeet provider or at the per-car level) could be taxed or auc-
tioned by governmental bodies.
3.7.2. Federal taxes and local primacy
With the advent of ACES, both local as well as national bodies will have
a strong incentive to implement road tolls, for revenue as well as steering
reasons, as outlined in the previous section. National bodies are likely to
be relatively more focused on revenue motives, as vehicle-related tax reve-
nues (most of which are currently collected at the federal level, see
Section 2.1) are expected to decrease substantially (as argued in
Section 3). An alternative to the decrease in ﬁscal revenues from vehicle re-
lated taxes might come in a form of a distance traveled charged as these do
not depend on the fuel type and vehicle ownership.
Federal governments will be tempted to counterbalance the forgone tax
revenues due to the introduction of ACES, as macroeconomic beneﬁts from
ACES probably only materialize at high penetration rates in the long run
(see Section 3.2). As argued in the previous section, the primary and most
obvious possibility to generate additional tax revenues are road tolls;
more specialized taxes that target ACES directly (e.g. on batteries) may
lead to innovation hampering. Higher taxes on electricity are a rather
weak alternative as gasoline taxes are currently multiple factors larger
than those of electricity (OECD, 2013). Other counterarguments are the ex-
pected low public acceptance, and the possibility for tax evasion by private26 A good example is the recently leaked debate in the Dutch Transport ministry concerning
the introduction of distance-based charging in order to compensate for the fuel tax revenues
due to the higher share of electric (and fuel-efﬁcient) vehicles. Most interestingly, it is being
discussed whether the charge should only apply to electric vehicles (RTL Nieuws, 2019).
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earmarking of electricity tax revenues towards transport agencies. The com-
parably low revenue and the insufﬁcient steering potential make additional
taxes on electricity used for mobility purposes an unsuitable substitute for
fuel taxes (Alan, 2018). Besides road tolls, other feasible alternatives are a
moderate raise in tax rates that typically have a large base (income tax, corpo-
rate income tax, consumption taxes, etc.), or the introduction of a robot tax on
ACES replacing drivers (for further discussion, see Thuemmel, 2018).
It is conceivable that in the future the dominance of federal states in
levying vehicle-related taxes will shrink. The main reason is that cities are
likely to face negative externalities of ACES (congestion, pollution, noise,
accidents) more strongly but also at an earlier point in time, as they are
likely to encounter ACES diffusion prior to other areas (Kaas et al., 2016;
RCCAO;, 2016). This should make them more inclined to implement
steering instruments such as the differentiated road tolls described in the
previous section. The same is true for regulatory measures: cities might
for instance require ACES ﬂeet operators to tender for or buy licenses for
their cars, fulﬁll speciﬁc safety and environmental standards, or have
ACES in public ownership.27 Revenues from road tolls will then be captured
by these local (city) governments, as it is the case with most currently
existing urban tolling schemes (e.g., Milan, London, and virtually all
parking schemes).28 Moreover, cities will seek a replacement for a decrease
in revenues from parking charges and trafﬁc ﬁnes.
Substantial inter-jurisdictional competition between local or regional
public decision-makers may emerge. National bodies will mostly focus on
the taxation of trafﬁc on national roads (mostly highways and other main
roads of national interest), while local (in particular urban) governance
bodies will focus on the taxation of the secondary road network. As a sub-
stantial share of national roads (typically those with much trafﬁc) tend to
be located within city boundaries, legal disputes may arise about who is
able to determine the level of the road toll, and even more importantly,
who is the recipient of tax revenues.Multiple tax systems based on different
technologies are usually undesirable due to transaction costs; however, rev-
enue sharing may be an option. Similar issues arise at a supranational level,
including freight transport. For instance, regarding registration taxes (and
the corresponding VAT and excise taxes) as well as circulation taxes, tax
competition, and potentially a race to the bottom in tax rates, may emerge:
national governments have an incentive to lower their taxes rates in order
for ﬂeet operators to register their car ﬂeet in their country (Clark et al.,
2017). In countries where registration taxes are levied at the regional or
local level, this competition may take place even within jurisdictional
units located in the same country (Vanrykel et al., 2018).
Under the current vehicle taxation system at the federal level, the share
of vehicle-related taxes is likely to decrease, and in turn their steering
power is likely to diminish with the diffusion of ACES. Cities are then likely
to replace national or regional levels as the most relevant segmentation di-
mension that determines mobility behavior in terms of speed and scope
(Kaas et al., 2016). A future with high penetration rates of ACES may thus
entail higher vehicle-related tax revenues for local level of governance (in
particular cities), and lower vehicle-related tax revenues for higher gover-
nance levels (in particular, the federal state). We do not expect such a pro-
nounced shift on the expenditure side. As a result, we expect ACES to
further deepen inequalities between cities and rural areas in terms of access
to affordable mobility, as well as steering power increasingly being shifted
to local (urban) level of governance. This is in no case a forgone conclusion
as political, procedural and historical country speciﬁcs will be highly rele-
vant in the transition towards the new tax equilibrium.27 In a comparable case, some cities require car-sharing providers to operate (exclusively)
electric cars.
28 The local implementation of tolls is in line with beneﬁt principle, which states that those
who use a service should pay for the resulting costs (Lindahl, 1919; Musgrave et al., 1987)
as well as in line with a general trend of transferring ﬁscal responsibility to local governments
(see for instance, Goldman and Wachs, 2003).
103.7.3. Timing, path dependencies and lock-in effects
Path-dependencies and lock-in effects in suboptimal equilibria play a
substantial role in public ﬁnance (Kato, 2003), including the transport
sector.29 Path dependence of decisions acknowledges that a set of decisions
is determined by past decisions. Path dependencies can create conditions
which lead to inefﬁcient outcomes which may or may not be remediable
(Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995). When the transaction cost necessary to re-
verse past decisions are considered prohibitive, this can lead to a lock-in to
an inefﬁcient situationwhich is near impossible to change (David, 1985). In
the context of ACES and public ﬁnance implications, path dependencies
and lock-in effects might be highly relevant, for instance regarding owner-
ship structures: ﬂeet owners may potentially become very inﬂuential and
gain market power in many regions (possibly even leading to a deteriora-
tion of alternative transport modes) in particular due to the presence of
economies of scale. This can (partially) be avoided by establishing regula-
tions that actively encourage competition, which has recently happened
in other network- and platform-based industries: energy, telecommunica-
tion, insurance, and banking are prime examples, where regulations have
been introduced that shall decrease the consumers' switching costs between
providers and increase price transparency between providers. Market
power of single ﬂeet providers can also be limited by requiring them to par-
ticipate in public tenders (with speciﬁed requirements concerning pricing
and service levels). The later such regulations are imposed, the harder it be
to combat and regulate market dominance by one or few providers, as evi-
dent from other platform-based businessmodels: Google, Facebook, Amazon,
Apple, AirBnB, and from the transport sector, most famously, Uber, which
used their ﬁrst mover advantage to set new behavioral norms (Kenney and
Zysman, 2016). This is especially true if the regulation (potentially) leads to
price increases for consumers, and hence lacks public support.
Another important aspect is that ﬁscal policies can have an ambiguous
effect on innovation. If innovations are taxed too much and too early,
their roll-out will be slowed down. If they are not taxed enough or even sub-
sidized, tax advantages might be difﬁcult to abolish when the penetration
rate of the new technology has gained a signiﬁcant market share, due to a
lack of public acceptance.
Overall, the transition period towards ACES might be costly in terms of
foregone taxes (at least temporarily) and lock-in effects regarding sub-
optimal subsidies.
3.8. Conclusions and policy implications
Much of the recent mobility literature, frequently motivated by techno-
logical aspects (and often under the header of “smart mobility”), is domi-
nated by the view that ACES will predominantly have positive effects:
through the conservation of fossil fuels (if electricity for EVs is sourced
from renewables), by providing beneﬁts to people who are currently unable
to engage in independent mobility, the improved possibility for using travel
time productively, an overall increase in transport efﬁciency, decrease in
travel time, and the freeing up of public parking space. In this paper we
argue that these positive effects may materialize in the medium to long
term if ACES are well-managed in terms of public policy. Conversely, al-
most none of the beneﬁts might accrue (not even in the long term) if the
process is not well managed, due to path-dependencies with suboptimal
outcomes in terms of forgone tax revenue and high costs for the public sec-
tor. We discuss potential implications of these new technologies on ﬁscal
revenues and expenditures. Given that in most OECD countries a consider-
able share of (federal) tax revenues is composed of vehicle-related taxes (5–
10%), and given the expectation that ACES will require large infrastructure29 An illustrative example concerns shipping: a tax exemption for fuel used for inland ship-
ping along the entire Rhine river, has been signed in 1831 (MannheimAct); to this date the tax-
ation of fuel along the Rhine depends on whether the fuel is used for water or road transport
(CCNR, 2018). Another prominent example is the tax rate imposed on diesel, which is lower
than the tax imposed on petrol in many European countries, mainly due to lobby efforts by
the logistics and the agricultural sector (Transport and Environment, 2015). The resulting
larger share of Diesel cars in these countries and their higher PMx emissions compared to
petrol-based cars led to substantial air quality problems in urban areas.
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labor market outcomes, it is likely that both ﬁscal revenues and expendi-
tures will be substantially affected by the advent of ACES.
Clearly, as it is generally the case with disruptive technologies, future
scenarios are surrounded with uncertainty concerning technological devel-
opments, uptake by the public, and industry structure. Even though techno-
logical development will likely take place at the global level, the uptake and
industry structure might be local, and inﬂuenced by local preferences, insti-
tutional settings and the availability and quality of alternative modes (to
mention just a few factors). Despite the inherent uncertainty concerning
the future, we argue that policy makers should be aware of upcoming pub-
lic ﬁnance challenges and take them into account in their current and near-
term decision making. In the near term, public and academic discussion
should focus on developing a ﬁrmer grasp on the complex interrelationship
between public ﬁnance and ACES. For this reason, we mapped out the sta-
tus quo of the relationships between public ﬁnance and (passenger) trans-
port, summarized the likely ﬁscal implications of ACES under a laissez
faire approach, and came up with hypotheses concerning active public ﬁ-
nance policy in the advent of ACES. With the advent of ACES, it should
be possible to design public ﬁnances that account for the external costs of
transport through the use of tax instruments enabled by the new technolo-
gies. Speciﬁcally, we argue that the advent of ACES will require, but at the
same time enable (differentiated) road tolling at a wider scale. We also
argue that ACES will lead to disruptions in the ﬁscal revenues and expendi-
tures that accrue to federal and local governments, likely shifting more
power in transport policy making to the local (urban) level of governance.
Third, we argue that path dependencies are strong in transport policy mak-
ing, potentially leading to suboptimal ﬁscal policies that are hard to re-
adjust in the future. In line with citizens' preference for “predictable institu-
tions” (Teknologiradet, 2017), ﬁscal measures should be transparent, pre-
dictable and easy to understand (e.g. sudden price shocks should be
avoided).
As ACES are a developing and potentially fast spreading technology, dy-
namic policy adaptation is likely to be required, an area of research that has
so far not been very evident in transport economics but has been researched
more widely in other areas, such as environmental economics (e.g. Fischer
et al., 2003). Before introducing new policy instruments, it is vital to iden-
tify risks of lock-in effects, for instance by designing and evaluating differ-
ent policy transition paths. More speciﬁcally, future research should focus
on how differentiated road tolls can be designed in an optimal way, taking
into account both steering and revenue considerations, as well as the poten-
tial negative effect on ACES uptake and innovation, aswell as distributional
impacts. Effects on relatedmarkets (in particular, the labormarket and land
use), potential long-run dynamics and the inﬂuence of factors such as city
structure and institutional/legal settings need to be considered as well.
Focus should also put on analyzing the interplay between local, regional
and federal level of governance in the light of the introduction of ACES
and the corresponding effects on ﬁscal revenues and expenditures at
these different levels of governance, possibly using game theory and polit-
ical economy approaches. Finally, general equilibrium models and input-
output analyses will be useful to predict the economic effects of different
ﬁscal policies regarding ACES for different spatial units and socio-
economic groups.
References
INFRAS - Consultores em Transportes Inovação e Sistemas, 2002. Study on Vehicle Taxation
in the Member States of the European Union (European Commission).
Morris (2006). The fuel tax and alternatives for transportation funding. https://prism.
ucalgary.ca/bitstream/handle/1880/44382/TransportPaper-Morris.pdf?sequence=1
RVO Dutch National Ofﬁce for Enterprising, 2013. Closer look at the development of electric
vehicles in 2013 (in Dutch).
CBS Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2014). Gemeenten verwachten 660 miljoen euro aan
parkeerbelasting in 2014. https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2014/11/gemeenten-
verwachten-660-miljoen-euro-aan-parkeerbelasting-in-2014.
NPR National Public Radio (2015). Map: The Most Common* Job In Every State. https://
www.npr.org/sections/money/2015/02/05/382664837/map-the-most-common-job-in-
every-state.11Odyssee-Mure, 2015. Sectoral Proﬁle – Transport. Change in distance travelled by car. http://
www.odyssee-mure.eu/publications/efﬁciency-by-sector/transport/distance-travelled-
by-car.html.
Transport & Environment (2015). Europe's tax deals for diesel. https://www.
transportenvironment.org/sites/te/ﬁles/publications/2015_10_Europes_tax_deals_for_
diesel_FINAL.pdf
Frost and Sullivan, 2016. Future of Carsharing Market to 2025. http://www.frost.com/
sublib/display-report.do?id=MB4D-01-00-00-00.
RCCAO Residential and Civil Construction Alliance of Ontario (2016). Ontario Must Prepare
for Vehicle Automation: Automated vehicles can inﬂuence urban form, congestion and
infrastructure delivery. http://rccao.com/research/ﬁles/RCCAO_Vehicle-Automation_
OCT2016_WEB.pdf
ACEA European Automobile Manufacturers' Association, 2017. Tax Guide, 2017. http://
www.acea.be/uploads/news_documents/ACEA_Tax_Guide_2017.pdf.
Adler (2017). To prevent autonomous vehicles clogging our cities, we need to talk about road-
pricing. http://www.citymetric.com/transport/prevent-autonomous-vehicles-clogging-
our-cities-we-need-talk-about-road-pricing-3050.
BFS Bundesamt für Statistik, 2017. Kosten und Finanzierung des Verkehrs Strasse und
Schiene, 2014. https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/de/home/statistiken/mobilitaet-
verkehr/kosten-ﬁnanzierung/strasse-langsamverkehr.assetdetail.3482330.html.
CBS Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (2017). Provincies begroten 2,3 miljard voor verkeer
en vervoer. https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2017/08/provincies-begroten-2-3-
miljard-voor-verkeer-en-vervoer.
Teknologiradet, 2017. This Time Its Personal. The digital shift in the public sector https://
teknologiradet.no/wp-content/uploads/sites/19/2013/08/Report_This-time-its-per-
sonal_The-digital-shift-in-the-public-sector.pdf.
Eurostat (2018). Government revenue, expenditure and main aggregates. http://appsso.
eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=gov_10a_main
Statline (2018). Gemeentebegrotingen; hefﬁngen per gemeente. https://opendata.cbs.nl/
statline/#/CBS/nl/dataset/83642NED/table?ts=1519377066586
Jenn Alan (2018) Assessing Alternatives to California's Electric Vehicle Registration Fee. Insti-
tute of Transportation Studies, University of California, Davis, Research Report UCD-ITS-
RR-18-27.
Bloomberg (2017). Electric vehicle outlook – Executive Summary.
Ministry of Infrastructure, Public Works and Water Management (2014). Rijksuitgaven aan
vervoersinfrastructuur onveranderd op bijna 6 miljard euro. http://web.minienm.nl/
mob2014/4_5.html. Dutch Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment.
SAE International, 2016. Taxonomy and Deﬁnitions for Terms Related to Driving Automation
Systems for On-RoadMotor Vehicles. https://saemobilus.sae.org/content/j3016_201609.
Transport & Environment (2011). Q&A: funding for transport infrastructure in the new EU
budget. Comments on the Commission's communication “A Budget for Europe 2020”.
https://www.transportenvironment.org/publications/funding-transport-infrastructure-
new-eu-budget.
ACEA European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (2015). Tax Guide 2015. https://
www.vda.de/dam/vda/publications/2015/ACEA-TAX-GUIDE_2015/ACEA%20TAX%
20GUIDE_ 2015.pdf.
ACEA European Automobile Manufacturers' Association (2018). ACEA Pocket Guide 2018–
2019. http://www.acea.be/publications/article/acea-pocket-guide.
Adler, M.W., van Ommeren, J.N., 2016. Does public transit reduce car travel externalities?
Quasi-natural experiments' evidence from transit strikes. J. Urban Econ. 92, 106–119.
Adler, M. W., Liberini, F., Russo, A., and van Ommeren, J. N. (2019). The congestion relief
beneﬁt of public transit: evidence from Rome. CESifo Working Paper No. 7698.
Adler, M. W., Pasidis, I., Levkovich, O. and Lembcke, A. C. (forthcoming). Roads, Market Ac-
cess and Regional Economic Development. OECD Publishing.
Ahmad, E., Brosio, G. (Eds.)., 2015. Handbook of Multilevel Finance. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Anderson, M.L., 2014. Subways, strikes and slowdowns: the impacts of public transit on trafﬁc
congestion. Am. Econ. Rev. 104 (9), 2763–2796.
Antón-Sarabia, A., Hernández-Trillo, F., 2014. Optimal gasoline tax in developing, oil-produc-
ing countries: The case of Mexico. Energy Policy 67, 564–571.
API American Petroleum Institute, 2019. State Motor Fuel Report. July, Accessed 15 (07), 19.
https://www.api.org/~/media/Files/Statistics/State-Motor-Fuel-Taxes-Report-July-19.pdf.
van Arem, B., Driel, C.J., Visser, R., 2006. The impact of cooperative adaptive cruise control
on trafﬁc-ﬂow characteristics. IEEE Trans. Intell. Transp. Syst. 7 (4), 429–436.
Bansal, P., Kockelman, K.M., Singh, A., 2016. Assessing public opinions of and interest in new
vehicle technologies: an Austin perspective. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging
Technologies 67, 1–14.
Begg, D., 2014. A 2050 Vision for London: What Are the Implications of Driverless Transport.
Clear Channel, London.
Bertoncello, M., Wee, D., 2015. Ten Ways Autonomous Driving Could Redeﬁne the Automo-
tive World (McKinsey and Company).
Bischoff, J., Maciejewski, M., 2016. Autonomous taxicabs in Berlin–a spatiotemporal analysis
of service performance. Transportation Research Procedia 19, 176–186.
Bjertnæs, G. H. (2017). The efﬁcient combination of taxes on fuel and vehicles. https://brage.
bibsys.no/xmlui/bitstream/handle/11250/2477055/DP867_web.pdf?sequence=3.
Brons, M., Nijkamp, P., Pels, E., Rietveld, P., 2008. A meta-analysis of the price elasticity of
gasoline demand. A SUR approach. Energy Econ. 30 (5), 2105–2122.
Brown, A., Gonder, J., Repac, B., 2013. An analysis of possible energy impacts. In: Meyer, G.,
Beiker, S. (Eds.), Road Vehicle Automation. Springer, Berlin, pp. 137–153.
Burgstaller, S., Flowers, D., Tamberrino, D., Terry, H.P., Yang, Y., et al., 2017. Rethinking mo-
bility. The Pay-as-You-Go Car: Ride Hailing Just the Start. Venture Capital Horizons.
Goldman Sachs.
Calthrop, E., Proost, S., 1998. Road transport externalities. Environ. Resour. Econ. 11 (3–4), 335.
Calvert, S.C., Schakel, W.J., van Lint, J.W.C., 2017.Will automated vehicles negatively impact
trafﬁc ﬂow? J. Adv. Transp. 2017.
CCNR Central Commission for the Navigation of the Rhine (2018). Legal Basis. https://www.
ccr-zkr.org/11020100-en.html.
M.W. Adler et al. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxxCEBR, 2014. Economic and Environmental Costs of Gridlock: An Assessment of the Direct and
Indirect Economic and Environmental Costs of Idling During Heavy Road Trafﬁc Conges-
tion to Households in the UK, France and Germany. UK, London.
Chen, T.D., Kockelman, K.M., Hanna, J.P., 2016. Operations of a shared, autonomous, electric
vehicle ﬂeet: implications of vehicle and charging infrastructure decisions. Transp. Res. A
Policy Pract. 94, 243–254.
Clark, B., Larco, N., Mann, R., 2017. The Impacts of Autonomous Vehicles and E-Commerce
on Local Government Budgeting and Finance. Urbanism Next, Sustainable Cities Initia-
tive. University of Oregon https://cpb-us-e1.wpmucdn.com/blogs.uoregon.edu/dist/f/
13615/ﬁles/2017/07/Impacts-of-AV-Ecommerce-on-Local-Govt-Budget-and-Finance-
SCI-08-2017-2n8wgfg.pdf.
Condliffe, J., 2017. Intelligent Machines. Why Some Autonomous Cars Are Going to Avoid the
Internet. MIT Technology Review https://www.technologyreview.com/s/603339/why-
some-autonomous-cars-are-going-to-avoid-the-internet.
Congressional Budget Ofﬁce, 2012. The budget and economic outlook: ﬁscal years 2012 to
2022. Publication 4474 (Washington, DC).
Cornet, A., Mohr, D., Weig, F., Zerlin, B., Hein, A.P., 2012. Mobility of the Future. Opportuni-
ties for Automotive OEMs. McKinsey and Company.
Currie, G., 2018. Lies, damned lies, AVs, shared mobility, and urban transit futures. J. Public
Transp. 21 (1), 3.
David, P., 1985. Clio and the economics of QWERTY. Am. Econ. Rev. 75, 2.
Davidson, P., Spinoulas, A., 2015. Autonomous vehicles: what could this mean for the future
of transport? Australian Institute of Trafﬁc Planning and Management (AITPM) National
Conference, Brisbane, Queensland
De Borger, B., 2001. Discrete choice models and optimal two-part tariffs in the presence of ex-
ternalities: optimal taxation of cars. Reg. Sci. Urban Econ. 31, 471–504.
De Borger, B., Proost, S., 2012. A political economy model of road pricing. J. Urban Econ. 71
(1), 79–92.
Dijk, M., Wells, P., Kemp, R., 2016. Will the momentum of the electric car last? Testing an hy-
pothesis on disruptive innovation. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 105, 77–88.
Duranton, G., Turner, M.A., 2011. The fundamental law of road congestion: evidence from US
cities. Am. Econ. Rev. 101 (6), 2616–2652.
Duranton, G., Morrow, P.M., Turner, M.A., 2014. Roads and trade: evidence from U.S. cities.
Rev. Econ. Stud. 81 (2), 681–724.
Eliasson, J., 2014. Opportunities for transport ﬁnancing through new technologies. Urban Ac-
cess for the 21st Century: Finance and Governance Models for Transport Infrastructure.
Routledge, Oxon/NewYork, pp. 118–145.
Eugensson, A., Brännström, M., Frasher, D., Rothoff, M., Solyom, S., Robertsson, A., 2013. En-
vironmental, Safety Legal and Societal Implications of Autonomous Driving Systems. In
Proceedings of the International Technical Conference on the Enhanced Safety of Vehi-
cles (ESV)Seoul, South Korea.
European Commission (2002). Study on vehicle taxation in the member states of the
European Union. https://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/ﬁles/docs/
body/vehicle_tax_study_15-02-2002.pdf.
European Commission, 2011. Roadmap to a single European transport area – towards a com-
petitive and resource efﬁcient transport system. Communication on the Europe 2020 Ini-
tiative, and Innovation Union, C. (O. M) (30 pages).
Fagnant, D.J., Kockelman, K.M., 2014. The travel and environmental implications of shared
autonomous vehicles, using agent-based model scenarios. Transportation Research Part
C: Emerging Technologies 40, 1–13.
Fagnant, D.J., Kockelman, K.M., 2015. Preparing a nation for autonomous vehicles: opportu-
nities, barriers and policy recommendations. Transp. Res. A Policy Pract. 77, 167–181.
Fischer, C., Parry, I.W., Pizer, W.A., 2003. Instrument choice for environmental protection
when technological innovation is endogenous. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 45 (3), 523–545.
Frey, C.B., Osborne, M.A., 2017. The future of employment: how susceptible are jobs to
computerisation. Technol. Forecast. Soc. Chang. 114, 254–280.
Fullerton, D., West, S.E., 2002. Can taxes on cars and on gasoline mimic an unavailable tax on
emissions. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 43 (1), 135–157.
Fullerton, D., West, S.E., 2010. Tax and subsidy combinations for the control of Car pollution.
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis and Policy 10 (1).
Fung, B. (2016), “How Driverless Cars Could Kill the Speeding Ticket—and Rob Your City.”
Washington Post, January 22. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/
2016/01/22/how-driverless-cars-could-kill-the-speeding-ticket-and-rob-your-city/.
Gawron, J.H., Keoleian, G.A., De Kleine, R.D., Wallington, T.J., Kin, H.C., 2018. Life cycle as-
sessment of connected and automated vehicles: sensing and computing subsystem and ve-
hicle level effects. Environ. Sci. Technol. 52, 3249–3256.
Goldman, T., Wachs, M., 2003. A Quiet Revolution in Transportation Finance: The Rise of
Local Option Transportation Taxes. University of California Transportation Center.
Gomez, J., Vassallo, J.M., 2013. Comparative Analysis of Road Financing Approaches in
Europe and the United.
Wakeley, H. L, Grifﬁn,W.M., Hendrickson, C, andMatthews, H. S. (2008). "Alternative transpor-
tation fuels: Distribution infrastructure for hydrogen and ethanol in Iowa." Journal of Infra-
structure Systems, https://doi.org/10.1061/(ASCE) 1076–0342(2008)14:3(262), 262–271.
Guerra, E., 2016. Planning for cars that drive themselves: metropolitan planning organiza-
tions, regional transportation plans, and autonomous vehicles. J. Plan. Educ. Res. 36
(2), 210–224.
Harper, C.D., Hendrickson, C.T., Mangones, S., Samaras, C., 2016. Estimating potential in-
creases in travel with autonomous vehicles for the non-driving, elderly and people with
travel-restrictive medical conditions. Transportation Research Part C: Emerging Technol-
ogies 72, 1–9.
Hensher, D.A., 2018. Tackling road congestion–what might it look like in the future under a
collaborative and connected mobility model? Transp. Policy 66, A1–A8.
Hörl, S., Ciari, F., Axhausen, K.W., 2016. Recent perspectives on the impact of autonomous
vehicles. Arbeitsberichte Verkehrs-und Raumplanung 1216.
IEA, 2019. Global EV Outlook 2019. IEA, Paris www.iea.org/publications/reports/
globalevoutlook2019/.12ING (2017). Breakthrough of electric vehicles threatens European car industry. https://www.
ing.nl/media/ing_ebz_breakthrough-of-electric-vehicle-threatens-european-car-industry_
tcm162-128687.pdf.
Innes, R., 1996. Regulating automobile pollution under certainty, competition, and imperfect
information. J. Environ. Econ. Manag. 31, 219–239.
ITF International Transport Forum, 2017. Managing the transition to driverless road freight
transport: case speciﬁc policy analysis. International Transport Forum (ITF), Paris, France.
Kaas, H.W., et al., 2016. Automotive Revolution – Perspective Towards 2030. How the Con-
vergence of Disruptive Technology-Driven Trends Could Transform the Auto Industry.
McKinsey and Company.
Kaddoura, I., Bischoff, J., 2017. Towards welfare optimal operation of shared autonomous ve-
hicles. European Association of Research in Transportation (hEART) Conference, p. 2017.
Kageson, J., 2005. Reducing CO2 Emissions from New Cars. European Federation for Trans-
port and Environment.
Karpilow, Q., Winston, C., 2016. A New Route to Increasing Economic Growth: Reducing
Highway Congestion with Autonomous Vehicles. Unpublished paper.
Kato, J., 2003. Regressive Taxation and the Welfare State: Path Dependence and Policy Diffu-
sion. Cambridge University Press.
Kenney, M., Zysman, J., 2016. The rise of the platform economy. Issues in Science and Tech-
nology 32 (3), 61.
KiM – Netherlands Institute for Transport Analysis, 2015. Driver at the Wheel? Self-driving
Vehicles and the Trafﬁc and Transport System of the Future. Dutch Ministry of Infrastruc-
ture and Environment.
Langer, A., Maheshri, V., Winston, C., 2017. From gallons to miles: a disaggregate analysis of
automobile travel and externality taxes. J. Public Econ. 152, 34–46.
Leech, J., Hawes, M., Whelan, G., Scharring, K., Bahiji, M., 2015. Connected and Autonomous
Vehicles-the UK Economic Opportunity (KPMG).
Liebowitz, S.J., Margolis, S.E., 1995. Path dependence, lock-in, and history. J. Law Econ. Org.
11, 1.
Lindahl, E. (1919[1964]). Just taxation – a positive solution. In Richard A.Musgrave and Alan
T. Peacock (eds), Classics in the Theory of Public Finance, London: Macmillan, 168–76.
Link, H., Kunert, U., 2017. Staatliche Einnahmen Und Ausgaben Im Verkehrssektor: Analyse
der Datensituation Und Konzeptionelle Erfordernisse für Eine Finanzierungsrechnung.
Ökonomischer Vergleich der Verkehrsträger. https://www.umweltbundesamt.de/sites/
default/ﬁles/medien/1410/publikationen/2017-12-20_texte_116-2017_oekonom_
verkehr_teil1.pdf.
Litman, T. (2015). Transit price elasticities and cross-elasticities. www.nctr.usf.edu/jpt/pdf/
JPT 7-2 Litman.pdf.
Litman, T., 2017. Autonomous Vehicle Implementation Predictions: Implications for Trans-
port Planning (Victoria Transport Policy Institute).
Liu, J., Kockelman, K.M., Boesch, P.M., Ciari, F., 2017. Tracking a system of shared autono-
mous vehicles across the Austin, Texas network using agent-based simulation. Transpor-
tation 44 (6), 1261–1278.
Mares, R., Stix, C., Dewey, S., 2018. How Autonomous Vehicles Will Drive Our Budgets. An
Analysis of the economic and ﬁscal impacts of self-driving cars on the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts. Conservation Law Foundation (CLF) https://www.clf.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2018/07/CLF_AV_Report.pdf.
IHS Markit (2014). Self-Driving Cars Moving into the Industry's Driver's Seat. http://news.
ihsmarkit.com/press-release/automotive/self-driving-cars-moving-industrys-drivers-seat.
Martinez, L., Christ, P., 2015. Urban mobility system upgrade–how shared self-driving cars
could change city trafﬁc. International Transport Forum, Paris.
May, J. (2017). A Canadian town is paying Uber to give its citizens lifts because it can't be
bothered to sort out a bus route. http://www.citymetric.com/transport/canadian-town-
paying-uber-give-its-citizens-lifts-because-it-cant-be-bothered-sort-out-bus.
McKerracher, C., et al., 2016. An Integrated Perspective on the Future of Mobility (McKinsey
and Company and Bloomberg New Energy Finance).
McKinsey & Company. (2019) Making Electric Vehicles Proﬁtable, https://www.mckinsey.
com/industries/automotive-and-assembly/our-insights/making-electric-vehicles-
proﬁtable
Michielsen, T., Gerlagh, R., van den Bijgaart, I., Nijland, H., 2015. Fiscal Policy and CO2 Emis-
sions of New Passenger Cars in the EU (CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy
Analysis).
Milakis, D., Snelder, M., Van Arem, B., Van Wee, B., Correia, G., 2015. Development of Auto-
mated Vehicles in the Netherlands: Scenarios for 2030 and 2050. Delft University of
Technology, Delft.
Milakis, D., Snelder, M., van Arem, B., Homem de Almeida Correia, G., van Wee, G.P., 2017a.
Development and transport implications of automated vehicles in the Netherlands: sce-
narios for 2030 and 2050. Eur. J. Transp. Infrastruct. Res. 17 (1).
Milakis, D., Van Arem, B., Van Wee, B., 2017b. Policy and society related implications of au-
tomated driving: a review of literature and directions for future research. Journal of Intel-
ligent Transportation Systems 1–25.
Mohring, H., 1972. Optimization and scale economies in urban bus transportation. Am. Econ.
Rev. 62, 591–604.
Musgrave, Richard A., Musgrave, Peggy B., Bird, Richard M., 1987. Public Finance in Theory
and Practice, 1st. Canadian edition. McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Toronto.
Musick, N., Petz, A., 2015. Public Spending on Transportation andWater Infrastructure, 1956
to 2014.
Naess-Schmidt, S. andWiniarczyk (2009). Company car taxation. Subsidies, welfare and envi-
ronment. Copenhagen Economics report for the European Commission. https://ec.eu-
ropa.eu/taxation_customs/sites/taxation/ﬁles/docs/body/taxation _paper_22_en.pdf.
Nash, C. (2003). Uniﬁcation of accounts and marginal costs for Transport Efﬁciency. https://
trimis.ec.europa.eu/project/uniﬁcation-accounts-and-marginal-costs-transport-
efﬁciency#tab-docs.
RTL Nieuws, 2019. Kabinet werkt aan invoering rekeningrijden in, 2026. https://www.
rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/politiek/artikel/4758161/kabinet-werkt-aan-invoering-
rekeningrijden-2026.
M.W. Adler et al. Transportation Research Interdisciplinary Perspectives xxx (xxxx) xxxNSTIFC National Surface Transportation Infrastructure Financing Commission, 2009. Paying
our Way: A New Framework for Transportation Finance. Washington, DC.
Oberholzer-Gee, F., Weck-Hannemann, H., 2002. Pricing road use: politico-economic and fair-
ness considerations. Transp. Res. Part D: Transp. Environ. 7 (5), 357–371.
OECD (2013). Taxing energy use: a graphical analysis. http://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/
taxingenergyuse.htm.
Oh, J.J., Sinha, K.C., 2010. Self-ﬁnancing and distance-based highway pricing scheme: state
highway system perspective. J. Infrastruct. Syst. 17 (3), 95–106.
Ostermeijer, F., Koster, H., Van Ommeren, J.N., 2018. Autonomous Vehicles, Residential
Parking Prices and Car Demand. Department of Spatial Economics VU University
Amsterdam, Eureka seminar.
Ostrovsky, M., Schwarz, M., 2018. Carpooling and the Economics of Self-Driving Cars. Work-
ing paper. http://web.stanford.edu/~ost/papers/sdc.pdf.
Parry, I.W., Small, K.A., 2005. Does Britain or the United States have the right gasoline tax?
Am. Econ. Rev. 95 (4), 1276–1289.
Parry, I.W., Small, K.A., 2009. Should urban transit subsidies be reduced? Am. Econ. Rev. 99
(3), 700–724.
Pernestål Brenden, A., and Kristoffersson, I. (2018). Effects of driverless vehicles: a review of
simulations (no. 2018: 11). CTS-Centre for Transport Studies Stockholm (KTH and VTI).
Peterson, J., & Lewis, R. (2017). Autonomous Vehicle Revenue Implications for Portland, Ti-
gard, and Tualatin. https://scholarsbank.uoregon.edu/xmlui/handle/1794/23311.
Proost, S., Van Dender, K., Courcelle, C., De Borger, B., Peirson, J., Sharp, D., ... den Bergh,
Van, 2002. How large is the gap between present and efﬁcient transport prices in Europe?
Transp. Policy 9 (1), 41–57.
Bloomberg Philantropies, 2017. Taming the Autonomous Vehicle. A Primer for Cities,
Bloomberg Philantropies and Aspen Institute.
Pigou, A.C., 1920. The Economics of Welfare. McMillan and Co., London.
Pinjari, A.R., Augustin, B., Menon, N., 2013. Highway Capacity Impacts of Autonomous Vehi-
cles: An Assessment. Center for Urban Transportation Research (CUTR). University of
South Florida http://www.tampa-xway.com/Portals/0/documents/Projects/AV/TAVI_
8-CapacityPinjari.pdf.
Pinkse, J., Bohnsack, R., Kolk, A., 2014. The role of public and private protection in disruptive
innovation: the automotive industry and the emergence of low-emission vehicles. J. Prod.
Innov. Manag. 31 (1), 43–60.
Pisarski, A.E., Wachs, M., 2012. Future ﬁnancing options to meet highway and transit needs.
Contractor's Final Report for NCHRP Project 20-24(49). Cooperative Highway Research
Program, Transportation Research Board, Washington, DC, National.
Pomerleau, K., 2015. How High Are Other Nations' Gas Taxes? Tax foundation https://
taxfoundation.org/how-high-are-other-nations-gas-taxes/
Ranft, F., Adler, M.W., Diamond, P., Guerrero, E., Laza, M., 2016. Freeing the Road: Shaping
the Future for Autonomous Vehicles. Policy Network Publication.
Raposo, Alonso, et al., 2018. An Analysis of Possible Socio-Economic Effects of a Cooperative,
Connected and Automated Mobility (CCAM) in Europe. European Commission Joint Re-
search Center.
Navigant Research (2016). Ford Sets a Date for Its Autonomous Vehicle Future. https://www.
navigantresearch.com/tag/level-4-autonomy.
Morgan Stanley Research, 2017. Auto Industry Braces for Electric Shock. On the charge Re-
port. https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/electric-car-supply-chain.
Rogers, E.M., 1995. Diffusion of Innovation. The Free Press, New York.
Saffo, P. and Bergbaum, A. (2013). “Are completely self-driving cars feasible in the foresee-
able future?” The Economist, 3 May 2013; at www.economist.com/debate/days/view/
974.
Schiller, T., Scheidl, J., Pottebau, T., 2017. Car sharing in Europe. Business Models, National
Variations and Upcoming Disruptions. Deloitte Monitor.13Schmidt, A., Reers, J., Gerhardy, A., 2018. Mobility as a Service. Mapping a Route Towards
Future Success in the Automotive Ecosystem. Accenture.
Schonberger, B., Gutmann, S., 2013. A Self-Driving Future: At the Intersection of Driverless
Cars and Car Sharing. Sightline Institute. http://daily.sightline.org/2013/06/04/a-self-
driving-future.
Schuitema, G., Steg, L., 2008. The role of revenue use in the acceptability of transport pricing
policies. Transport. Res. F: Trafﬁc Psychol. Behav. 11 (3), 221–231.
Volkskrant, 2014. Seven Tax Breaks on Electric Cars Cost Dutch Treasury €500m (29 March).
Shanker, R., Jonas, A., Devitt, S., Huberty, K., Flannery, S., Greene, W., ... Moore, J., 2013. Au-
tonomous Cars: Self-Driving the New Auto Industry Paradigm (Morgan Stanley).
Silberg, G., Wallace, R., Matuszak, G., Plessers, J., Brower, C., Subramanian, D., 2012.
Selfdriving Cars: The Next Revolution. KPMG and Center for Automotive Research.
KPMG: Center, for Automotive Research.
Slemrod, J., 1989. Optimal taxation and optimal tax systems. National Bureau of Economic
Research No. w3038.
Small, K., 2005. Road pricing and public transit: unnoticed lessons from London. Access 26
(3), 10–15.
Smith, B.W., 2012. Managing Autonomous Transportation Demand. Santa Clara Law Review
52 (4) Article 8; at. http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol52/iss4/8.
Sterner, T., 2012. Distributional effects of taxing transport fuel. Energy Policy 41, 75–83.
Tachet, R., Sagarra, O., Santi, P., Resta, G., Szell, M., Strogatz, S.H., Ratti, C., 2017. Scaling law
of urban ride sharing. Sci. Rep. 7.
Thakur, P., Kinghorn, R., Grace, R., 2016. Urban form and function in the autonomous era. In
Australasian Transport Research Forum (ATRF), 38th, 2016, Melbourne, Victoria,
Australia.
The Economist, 2017. Roadkill (August 12).
Thuemmel, U. (2018). Optimal taxation of robots. https://www.cesifo-group.de/dms/ifodoc/
docs/Akad_Conf/CFP_CONF/CFP_CONF_2018/pse18-van-der-Ploeg/Papers/pse18_
Thuemmel.pdf. Working paper.
Tresch, R.W., 2014. Public Finance: A Normative Theory. Academic Press.
Trommer, S., et al., 2016. Autonomous Driving. The Impact of Vehicle Automation on Mobil-
ity Behaviour. Institute of Transport Research www.ifmo.de/tl_ﬁles/publications_con-
tent/2016/ifmo_2016_Autonomous_Driving_2035_en.pdf.
Underwood, S., 2014. Automated, Connected, and Electric Vehicle Systems: Expert Forecast
and Roadmap for Sustainable Transportation. University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Gra-
ham Institute for Sustainability.
Vanrykel, F., De Borger, B., Bourgeouis, M., 2018. Sharing Cars: A Legal and Economic Anal-
ysis of the Taxation of B2C Carsharing Models (Unpublished working paper).
Small, K.A., Verhoef, E.T., 2007. The Economics of Urban Transportation. Routledge.
Vickrey, W.S., 1969. Congestion theory and transport investment. Am. Econ. Rev. 59 (2),
251–260.
Wagner, J., Baker, T., Goodin, G., Maddox, J., 2014. Policy Implications of Automated Vehi-
cles on Texas Highways. Technical Report 600451-00029-1 (Vol. 7). Texas A&M Trans-
portation Institute, College Station, Texas.
Walker, J., Johnson, C., 2016. Peak Car Ownership: The Market Opportunity of Electric Auto-
mated Mobility Services. Rocky Mountain Institute (2016). http://www.rmi.org/peak_
car_ownership.
Wijnen, W., Stroeker, N.E., 2009. Uitgaven aan verkeersveiligheid. Een schatting voor 2007.
SWOV, Stichting Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek Verkeersveiligheid.
Zhou, Y., Wang, M., Hao, H., Johnson, L., Wang, H., 2015. Plug-in electric vehicle market pen-
etration and incentives: a global review. Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Glob. Chang. 20 (5),
777–795.
